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Introduction

*
Luis Guasch and Steven Salop
A guarantee is a risk-sharing insurance contract tailored to the ris ky of uncertain flow of consUinption services . from a co mm odity (see Heal (197 6) ).
Guarantees provide for full or partial replacement , repair or refund for expected and unexpected short-falls in service . Indeed , Appelbaum and Scheffman (197 8) have provided an example in which th refund exceeds the pure hase pnce .
. 1 The guarantee may come into force in a variety of circwn stances ranging from specifically named contingencies to general promises of "satisfaction guaranteed or your money back . 11 Guarantees may be offered as a mandatory tie-in with purchase or may be optional ; we refer to the latter as service contracts . They may be priced on a per unit basis or offered at a fixed fee invariant of number of units purchased .
Guarantees can also be used as an information-generating , self-selec tion device . Consumers may utilize the .existence of a guarantee as a signal of .J-.... World Bank , University of California , and Georgetown University San Diego , Law Center , respectively . Views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of their afiiliated organizations . An earlier version of this paper was presented at the IV World Congress of theEconometric Society , Aix-en-Province , France , August198 0. We would like to thank Vince Crawford , MarkMachina , Andreu Mas-Colell , Walter Oi , Joel Sobel , and .Sevket Gunter for help.�. . ul comments on an earlier draft . We are also indebted to the two anonymous referees for excellent suggestions .
The FTC provided financial supJ.X>rt for parts of this research.
reliability -no seller would warrant junk.
In addition, a consumer 1 s selec ti.on of an optional service contract may reveal information about that buyer.
For exampl:.e, if product breakdown is caused by misuse or heavy use, com petitive firms wi. ll price different guarantees accordingly, either explicitly or implicitly, as explored by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1977) in a conventional insurance context.
Since guarantees reveal material information about buyers to firms. they may be utilized by firms with monopoly power as an instrument for price discriminating against less elastic submarkets. For example, risk aversion held constant, if the heavy user submarket has a more elastic demand than the light user submarket, a monopolist can discriminate against the light users as follows: he offers an optional service contract at a discount below the actuarial cost of the heavy users but above the actuarial cost of the light users. Indeed, if breakdown is correlated with use, any optional guarantee is more highly valued by heavy users than light users.
Then an optional guarantee is an instrument that simultaneously separates the market and charges a lower price to the more elastic submarket. Such "noisy monopolists"
have been explored by Salop (1977 ) and Stiglitz (1977) .
These models have the property that the monopolist finds it profitable to create a deadweight loss in order to reap the additional profit possible from price discrimination.
Extending that reasoning to the context of guarantees, it suggests that the monopolist might be willing to produce a product less reliable than dictated by cost minimization, in order to better discriminate. Risk aversion will only make tha t s tra tegy even more profi table .
In the spiri t of the Heal , Salop and S tigli tz this "noisy papers , monopolis t" finds i t profi table to produce , guaran tee , and replace defec tive uni ts , t ra tional produc tion even if a zero defec te could be achieved a t no addi cos t . The gains from extrac ting addi tional consumer surplus outweigh the deadweigh t cos t absorbed . A posi tive defec t ra te serves the following role :
if a zero defec te were selec ted , tilling to pur t ra consumers would be un chase such an op tional service con t , t tariff could trac and thus the two-par no t be effec ted . In addi wi the produc tion of tion , th risk averse consumers , defec ts serves to crea so the monopolis t can addi tionally gain by te risk , selling insurance agains t tha t risk .
Of course , if conven tional two-par t tariffs were available to the monopolis t , this indirec t (and os tly } t and service con t s tra tegy defec trac Oi developed the analysis of two part tariffs. He showed that the optimal p olicy for a monopolist, when feasible, is to charge an entrance fee into the market and then impose a price per unit equal to the marginal cost. This policy extracts all consumer surplus, since the entrance fee is set to equal the consumer surplus obtained when price equals marginal cost. In contrast to those results, the monopolist here sets the price per unit above the " effective" the prohibition against tied sales can also be evaded.
Finally, a number of other properties of the fixed fee service contract marginal cost (taking the expected cost of replacement into account). Indeed, he may charge a unit price in excess of even the zero-defect pure monopoly price. Thus, consumers may bear two losses relative to a conventional zero defect monopolist: higher prices plus the cost of the service contract. However, we carry out th analysis in term s of a representative consumer .
Denote by U(x,y) the representative conswner's direct utility func hence , tion, where x is the quantity of the com modity consum ed by the individual .
in the m onopolistic m arket under study , and y is the quantity consUined of a com posite aggregate of all the other co mm We asswne a zero incom e odities .
elasticity of dem and (no incom e effects) . Denote by p the unit price of the com m odity supplied by the m onopolist . We assum.e the prices of all other com m odities to be fixed ; thus , we norm alize the price of y 1 . as Letting A technology characterized by a constant proportion of nondefective units generates a distribution function F(z,x ; a) that gives the probability that the number of non-defective units is less or equal to z,
given that x units have be. en produced (or purchased by the consu mer).
Without loss of generality, we will assume that F follows a binomial dis tribution, with parameter a. For the defect-free technology, a = 1, F(z,x; 1)= 0 for z< x and F(x,x; 1)= 1 .
that F(·, ·;a ) We assume is known to consumers. For simplicity, we assumed consUiners do not obtain any utility from defective units. Therefore if the consumer purchases x units, of which exactly z are good, his total utility equals U(z, y ).
A.
Consumers'
Given a technology that generates a proportion (1 -a) of defects, suppos . the monopolist charges a price p per unit and also offers con sumers the option of purchasing a fixed fee service contract at a cost G. The consum er chooses the alternative yielding the largest expec ted utility , a., G ). As a convention we assume thatif the consumer given (p , is indifferent between buying the service contract and not , he will purchase i t . We will establish our results for the risk neutrality in income case, i.e. V(p, I) = ¢(p) + I. We are choosing this case for expositional simplicity and to illustrate that the results do not depend on risk aversion. Finally, this is the weakest case for our theory. For this case the consumer obtains the highest relative utility from foregoing the service contract. Therefore if it is optimal in this case for the monopolist to produce defectives and offer a service contract-option, it also will be optimal in the other cases (risk aversion}, because there the service contract fee will also include a risk premiwn. In Section 4 we show how our results easily extend to the case of risk aversion and/or costly transaction s. Until the, we assume that V(p, I) = ¢(p) + I, with ¢ ' < 0, ¢ " > 0... Then the utility of option I, or purchasing but foregoing the optional service contract, is ¢( [3 p) + I. Also by Roy's Identity, then, the demand function for the product can be expressed as x(p) = -¢ '(p); thus x is a normal good with a downward sloping demand function.
B.
The Problem
The monopolist's strategy space is A = [a., p, G} , 0 a. 1; namely an action in A describes a technology characterized by a pro portion a of non-defective units produced, a price p per unit purchased, and a price G for the optional fixed fee service contract. As mentioned above we assume that the distribution F(z, x; et) of defective units is binomial with parame ter a.
We assume a constant marginal production cost c that is independent of the defect rate. We will relax this assumption in Section 4.
Our aim is to show that the monopolist's profits are maximized by selecting a positive defect technology, Ct< 1 and offering consum.ers an optional service contract, 0 < G < Q) , as opposed to a defect-free technology,
We first obtain an expression for the optimal price G of the optional _ service contract. Since we are undertaking our analysis in terms of the representative consumer, the optional contract is necessarily purchased at the profit-maximizing price G. Therefore if V(p, I-G) is the consumer's utility of purchasing the service contract and V( p, I) is the utility of entering the market but not purchasing the service contract, then V(p, I-G) :<!:: V( p. I) . Moreover, in the absence of income effects at the optimum, the service contract constraint must be binding. Otherwise, if the morlopolist were to slightly increase the service contract fee G, no con sumers would leav the market and the monopolist would make higher profits .
Note that G does not affect the demand of the product or V( p. I) . Thus we can rewrite that constraint as follows.
Rewriting, we have the following expression for G,
Next, we show that given that the monopolist produces a certain percentage of defectives, he is better off offering a service contract option than not. To see this, note that if the consumer buys the service contract at price G and purchases x(p) units, the monopolist needs to manufacture .!. x(p) units, on a"'ferage, to replace defectives. Recalling that
then the monopolist's profit from offering the service contract option is 
By the mean value theorem, rewriting equation (4), we have
Since -¢'(C)> ¢'(8p) equations (5) and ( 2) follow. Therefore for any 8 and p, the strategy of offering a service contract optio n dominates the alternative of not offering that option. this result holds since if there is no service contract then the profit maximizing equals 1. 4 But at S = 1 there is no difference between the no service and service contract. Therefore if the optimal service contract has 13 > 1, then profits under the optimal service contract must be higher than under the optimal non-service contract.
We now s-olve for the (p, 8 , G ) that maximizes the monopolist's profits.
The monopolist's problem is given by
Market Entry Constraint
Recall that V 0 is the utility of staying out of the market, while V( 13 p, I ) i s the utility o f entering the market but not purchasing the service contract option. The opportunity set of a consumer under option I (entering the market) contains the choice element x = 0; hence, it follows that V( 13 p, I) V ; therefore, we can disregard the Market Entry Constraint.
0
To prove that the introduction of a positive -defect technology dominates pure monopoly pricing, we show that (6) has an optimum where
Since V(p, I) = ¢(p) + I, noting that ¢'(p) < 0 , ¢n(p) > 0, and x(p) = ¢1(p), we can rewrite the service contract constraint as follows, 
1.
The first order conditions are given as follows:
, with equality for 8> 1.
We now show that the solution to (7) must be an interior solution. First, we exclude p c. If the optimal p is less than c, i.e. p < c, then , and substituting for x -x , we have m Proof.
if p > c and (3 is near 1. This also can be seen by noting that m G'(l) >.6.C'( l ). 6 Hence for (3 near 1, G((3) >.6.C( 8 ). Thus, the service contract strategy is more profitable than pure monopoly pricing. Note that the argUinent presented above shows that our result does not depend on any risk aversion characteristics of the consumer. It only depends on the monopoly price exceeding the marginal cost and the price elasticity of demand being finite, both of which are inherent characteristics of a monopolist market structure.
of the Solution
Since the monopolist produces defects at a cost solely to effectuate the two-part tariff, it is apparent that total surplus is not maximized under this strategy.
This result is in contrast to Oi (1 9 71) in which a simple (defect-free) two-part tariff strategy does maximize total surplus, though the entire surplus accrues to the monopolist.
In this section, we explore several more properties of the profitmaximizing positive-defect strategy. These properties may be contrasted to both the conventional (defect-free) pure monopoly strategy and to Oi 1 s (defect-free) two-part tariff strategy.
Z. Unlike 2:
(defect-free) two-part tariff By con tradiction. Assume consUiner surplus, (CS) is zero under the optimal posi tive-defect strategy. Then,
Proposition
Defining marginal replace-
implying that at the effective price !3 p, the consumer leaves the market, i.e., x(!3p) = ¢'(!3p) = 0. Hence, for the first order condition (8) to equal zero, it must also be t x (p) = -¢1 (p) = 0. This means, therefore, that the consumer does not purchase under the monopolist's optimal strategy, a contradiction.
Q. E. D.
3. the effective to include the cost of defective units, the unit price ex ceeds the effective cost, i.e., p> Sc.
Proof. From the first order condition (9)
Since ¢1 < 0 and ¢n > 0, it follows that p> !3c .
Q. E.D.
As mentioned earlier, this result contrasts with the corresponding simplest model in Oi' s ( 1 97 1 ) "Disneyland Dilemm a" in which defect-free units were priced at marginal cost. 7
It would be of interest to compare the unit price charged by the mondpolist under the service contract strategy with the pure monopoly price.
The comparison is ambiguous. There are situations where the monopolist not only charges a fixed service contract fee, but also charges a higher unit price than the monopoly price. The analysis is shown in the Appendix , where
we present examples of each phenomenon.
In summ ary it is optimal for the monopolist. to produce defectives and offer a service contract, even though a zero defect rate could be achieved at no extra cost. Since the conswners have the option to enter the market without purchasing the , service contract, the amount of constuner surplus the monopolist can extract is bounded by the utility of that option.
Thus the consumer retains a positive surplus. Finally, the price charged by the monopolist is greater than the effective marginal cost and can even be greater than the pure monopoly price.
Extension s
In this section we explore the sensitivity of our results to the as sum.p tions made in the model.
Up to now, we asswned conswners are risk neutral in income. As hinted previously, our results do not depend on that assumption. They extend easily to the risk aversion case. The · argmnent is the following. Let U(x, y) and V(p, I) be the direct and indirect utility functions respectively and V(p, I, a) the utility the consur.ner obtains when entering the market with a percentage of. non-defective units a, and not purchasing the service contract option. That utility will not be greater than the utility the consumer would obtain if he were to face a price p for good units with certainty, i. e.
V( p, I).
If we were to solve the problem using V( p, I) instead of V(p, I, a)
in the service contract constraint, our results still hold, because the prob lem is the same. But the fact that V(p, I, a) V( p, I) implies that the optional service contract strategy, > 1, G > 0, will be even more profitable. Our analysis generalizes easily in all the cases except g(S) = k.
Introduction of an optimal fixed fee service contract implies a choice of 8 in excess of that chosen by the simple monopolist, or f3 > 1. This result can be obtained by showing that at the profit-maximizing optimum g '(f3) = 1 0 c (S) + S c '(S) > 0 . Thus, costs are not minimized.
Up to now we have assumed a zero income elasticity of demand.
This assumption is critical to the analysis. A high income elasticity of demand implies that the quantity demanded of the product is significantly affected when the consumer were to purchase the service contract. The effect of this demand shift may alter the optimality of the service contract strategy with respect to its alternatives. On the ot her hand, by continuity, our results should hold at least for fairly low income elasticities of demand.
Thus the zero elasticity assumption is sufficient but may not be necessary .
Co nclusion
We have shown that firms endowed with monopoly power can utilize a service contract form of guarantee as an instrument for effecting a two-part tariff.
The monopolist finds it profitable to produce, guarantee, and replace defe1 tive units, even if a zero defect rate could be achieved at no additional p roduction cost. The gains from extracting additional consumer surplus outweigh the deadweight cost absorbed in replacing defectives. In contrast to Oi's (1971) corresponding results, we demonstrate that the price per unit charged by the monopolist is greater than the ' 'effective" marginal cost; it _ may even be higher than the pure monopoly price. Moreover, the monopolist is unable to extract all of the consumer surplus.
These results are obtained under the assumption that there are no income effects; thus, we can conjecture that as long as these effects are not
e _ _
{A3)
Notice that in general the elasticities in (A2) and (A3) will differ, because they are evalUated at different prices. Therefore a direct compari son cannot be made. But, given a constant elasticity demand function, the unit price charged by the mono polist under the defective technology exceeds the pure monopoly price if
We give two examples below. The first fulfills condition (A4) , thereby generating a unit price greater than the pure mono poly price. The second generates the opposite, a unit price below the mono poly price.
Example 1: Constant Elasticity. Let the indirect utility function be
-(a +l} Since x(p, I-G) = k ap
• the price elasticity of demand is a constant, e = -(a+l). Utilizing (7) , the monopolist profit function can be written as
For the optimal . we have * * l/a (a + l)/a = ((a+ 2)/(a + l)) > 1. The optinial price per unit is p =c((a+2)/(a+l)) * 2 2 It is easy to confirm that > € /(e -1) . Since the pure monopoly price is ... ,., * p = c((a+l )/a), it follows that p > p; the monopolist not only charges a fixed service contract fee, but also charges a price per unit higher than the monopoly price.
20
Example 2 . opposite result, i.e. , p
The following quadratic utility function gives rise to the A 2 * < p. Let U(x, y) = y -(1 /2)(x-k) for x ::;; k, where x is the commodity produced by the monopolist. Then the indirect utility func tion is V(p, I-G 
The demand function is given by x(p, I-G )
k-p for p::;; k, 0 for p k, and the service contract fee G = (1/2)(1 -S 2 )p 2 + (13-l) kp. The profit function is iT= (p-13c)(k-p)+ (l/2)(1-13 2 )p 2 + { S-l) kp. f" Notes 1 This does not rely on conswner losses in excess of the purc hase price. Instead, the driving force of the example is that consumers underestimate the reliability of the commodity; the guarantee penalty is so large that consumers hope the commodity does break down. 2 That is, the "metering" rationale for a tie-in is not reached in our analysis, c£., Bowman (1957) .
3
This convention is inessential.
4
We are grateful to the referee for pointing this case to us.
5
. o he ex1stence o f . we are f course to ensure t . pos1hve pro 1ts, assuming that the marginal utility at zero is greater than the marginal cost of production. Oi's later analysis of consumer heterogeneity does lead to price above marginal cost for some cases.
8 As mentioned , with risk averse consumers , the monopolist has additional incentives to produce defects for the purpose of selling insurance against the risk of defects. The more risk averse consumers are, the more profitable is the service contract fee strategy. Th is also leads to additional results. For any risk averse consumer , the riskier is the distribution tha t he faces (holding the mean constant) the greater is the profitability of th e service contract fee strategy for the monopolist This can be easily seen .
by noting that the service contract fee G is constrained to satisfy 22 V(p, I-G) V(p, I, a.) for any particular defect rate selected. Thus, the monopolist has an incentive to produce that risk as efficiently as possible, namely, for any p and a. he should try to make V(p, I, a.) as small as possible. For any particular defect rate {1 the effective risk con -a.) , swner faces is affected by the manner in which the monopolist "packages" defective and non-defective units. An analysis of optimal pack aging tech nologies is presented in Braverman, Guasch and Salop (1 9 8 2).
9 whatever the consumer strategy is, his utility of enteri g th e market but not purchasing the service contract option would be less than V( p, I). Therefore via analogous re soning, our results would hold in that case too. 
